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Under bankruptcy law, a debtor cannot enter into a binding agreement with a
creditor to not file for bankruptcy in the future. However, creditors can in effect prevent a corporate debtor from filing for bankruptcy by obtaining a special “golden
share” in the debtor and exercising the right to veto its bankruptcy concomitant with
such a share. Currently, courts decide whether to invalidate a golden share veto
right based on whether the right is equivalent to a bankruptcy waiver. However, the
current rule may lead to either underdeterrence of bad faith vetoes or discouragement of good faith corporate decision-making.
This Comment advances a novel approach that draws on the fiduciary duty
doctrine in corporate law. It argues that golden shareholders should be viewed as
controlling shareholders of the debtor company and therefore bear fiduciary duties
with respect to the debtor’s decision to file for bankruptcy. This way, any golden
shareholder who vetoes bankruptcy to advance its interests as a creditor risks being
punished for a duty of loyalty violation, while shareholders who veto bankruptcy in
good faith are protected.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose you are a large investment fund that just loaned
money to a company. Like many large lenders, you secured the
loan with the company’s equipment as collateral. But unfortunately, the company missed an interest payment and defaulted
under the terms of its notes. What’s worse, it subsequently filed
for bankruptcy.
The automatic stay kicks in. Now you cannot foreclose on
your collateral or sue the company.1 The company happened to

1

See 11 USC § 362.
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file for protection under Chapter 11 and gets to keep the equipment while it manages to stay in business.2 In the meantime, you
watch your collateral depreciate, knowing that even if you finally
get your hands on it, you will never fully recoup what you are
owed. You swear you will never let this happen to you again.
You make a secured loan to another company. This time, in
the loan agreement, you add a clause that reads: “The Company
shall not file for bankruptcy.” Your lawyer quickly crosses it out.
“A court will never enforce this,” says the lawyer. “It’s against
public policy. The court will think you’re blocking the debtor’s
right to a fresh start.”3 You are puzzled: “What fresh start? It’s a
company. Companies dissolve all the time!” The lawyer shrugs.
“For the interest rate I’m accepting, I at least deserve some peace
of mind!” you grumble. Your lawyer promises to get you what
you want.
The next day, the lawyer tells you that the company is willing
to give you 100 percent of its authorized preferred shares to get
you to agree to make the loan. What’s more, the company will
amend its charter so that it can never file for bankruptcy without
the consent of a majority of its preferred shareholders. You say:
“So this means I can block its bankruptcy?”
The lawyer nods: “Now you would be doing it as the debtor’s
shareholder. Delaware allows shareholders to draft their corporate charter freely, including determining when the company can
file for bankruptcy.4 The court is not going to meddle in your decisions for the company because you’re a part of the company,
thanks to those shares. They are called the ‘golden shares.’” 5 You
are delighted. You have your lawyer draft the agreement overnight, and you sign it happily the next day.
Unfortunately, you cannot catch a break, and the company
defaults. It then files for bankruptcy without letting you vote on
the decision whether to file at all. Exasperated, you sue to dismiss
the bankruptcy case, and the company argues that your veto right

2
See 11 USC §§ 1101–95. See also Kenneth Ayotte and Stav Gaon, Asset-Backed
Securities: Costs and Benefits of “Bankruptcy Remoteness”, 24 Rev Fin Stud 1299,
1307 (2011).
3
See, for example, In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc, 12 Bankr 989, 1009 (Bankr
ND Ga 1980) (refusing to enforce such a clause, emphasizing “the strong legislative purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to provide a ‘fresh start’ to debtors”).
4
Like many companies, your debtor is incorporated in Delaware. See note 9.
5
See In re Franchise Services of North America, Inc, 891 F3d 198, 205 (5th Cir
2018). See also note 53 and accompanying text.
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is an invalid bankruptcy waiver and therefore against public policy. The court looks at the loan and your preferred shares. “Those
are a lot of shares,” thinks the court. “And the charter does allow
it to veto. In all invalid bankruptcy waiver cases, the contract is
between a debtor and an external creditor. But a company’s owners should manage it in the way they want, even if one of them is
also a creditor.” It then dismisses the case. You immediately
foreclose on your security interests and get your money back. You
are happy.
But the company is unhappy. It had a nice reorganization
plan in mind that might have saved it if it still had its equipment.
The company’s other creditors are also unhappy. Some of them
hold bonds in investment portfolios and had no idea for a long
time why the trading price of the notes was falling. Others eventually realized what went wrong and managed to force the company into bankruptcy after some legwork.6 But the company, crippled by the loss of its key assets, cannot make money anymore
and has nothing left to offer. You’re the only one that ends up
happy in this story, and something does not seem quite right.
Ordinarily, the law prohibits a debtor from waiving the right
to bankruptcy to prevent stories like this one from unfolding. But
here, the secured creditor manages to block a debtor’s bankruptcy
by obtaining what is known as a golden share with a veto right.
Courts sometimes invalidate those rights and sometimes do not,
depending on whether the right is equivalent to a bankruptcy
waiver.7 But under the current state of the law, outcomes like this
story’s ending can still very well happen.
Advancing a novel approach drawing on corporate law, this
Comment tries to fix the problem that occurs in this story. If we
truly want to bar creditors from blocking bankruptcy in their selfinterest, then courts have been asking the wrong question about
golden shares. Instead of deciding whether the veto right is a
waiver, courts should ask whether the golden shareholder exercised each veto for the company’s benefit or its own benefit. To do
that, courts should impose fiduciary duties that exist under state
corporate law on the golden shareholder—that is, by viewing the
golden shareholder as the debtor’s controlling shareholder. As a

6
Under the Bankruptcy Code, creditors can initiate a bankruptcy case for their
debtor as an involuntary petition, thus effectively forcing the debtor into bankruptcy, if
they satisfy certain conditions. For details, see 11 USC § 303.
7
See Part III.
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fiduciary, the golden shareholder would have to further the interests of the debtor and the other creditors in deciding whether to
veto the debtor’s bankruptcy petition.8 This Comment discusses
how this approach is viable only for Delaware business organizations, but the basic fiduciary principles underlying this approach
should be consistent with the spirit of corporate law in most
states.9
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I examines the
reasons for bankruptcy waiver prohibitions that courts have proffered and argues that bankruptcy is made mandatory to protect
creditors’ common interest and maximize collective recovery.
Part II explains in detail how the golden share can be used to
block bankruptcy. Part III discusses existing case law on golden
share provisions and problems resulting from courts’ focus on
whether a provision constitutes a bankruptcy waiver. Part IV
proposes that courts should treat vetoes exercised by golden
shareholders as “interested transactions” and apply entire fairness review and explains why, in light of both corporate and bankruptcy law doctrine, a fiduciary duty should be imposed on golden
shareholders.
I. WHY BANKRUPTCY WAIVERS ARE PROHIBITED
Under settled bankruptcy law, an agreement with a creditor
not to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition in the future is unenforceable as an ipso facto clause.10 While the Supreme Court has
not decided the issue, in United States v Royal Business Funds
Corp,11 the Second Circuit acknowledged the “general rule[ ] that
a debtor may not agree to waive the right to file a bankruptcy
petition.”12 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has held that a debt settlement agreement provision obliging the debtor not to file for
8

See Part IV.A.
In almost every state, “courts have held that majority shareholders have a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders as a class.” 12B Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 5811 (West 2019). See also id at § 5811.50 (“[I]t is possible for a shareholder to
be subject to a fiduciary duty even though not a majority shareholder, provided he or she
is the ‘controlling’ shareholder.”). This Comment discusses Delaware law as most large
corporations are incorporated in Delaware. See Delaware Division of Corporations, Annual Report Statistics (2018), archived at https://perma.cc/N5DH-HLEA.
10 See 11 USC § 363(l). For a discussion of ipso facto clauses generally, see Thomas
H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91
Yale L J 857, 887–92 (1982). See also Mikel R. Bistrow, Waiver of Bankruptcy Protections
in Pre-Bankruptcy Workout Agreements, 8 Loyola Consumer L Rptr 291, 292 (1996).
11 724 F2d 12 (2d Cir 1983).
12 Id at 15.
9
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bankruptcy is unenforceable, announcing that prepetition waivers of Bankruptcy Code protections are “against public policy,”13
which is also the rationale numerous lower courts have offered.
This Part explains that the public policy underlying the rule
against corporate bankruptcy waivers aims to solve the “common
pool” problem and to maximize the collective benefits of all creditors of an insolvent corporation. This Part also clarifies that the
familiar “fresh start” policy of bankruptcy law does not apply to
corporations.
A. Solving the Common Pool Problem
The common pool problem—similar to the tragedy of the commons—refers to a scenario in which owners of a limited common
resource tend to deplete the resource for their individual selfinterest, even though a restraint on usage would benefit all the
owners in the long run.14 Each owner has an incentive to overuse
the resource because each of them will be left with nothing if only
one of them exercises restraint. 15 This problem is particularly
acute for an insolvent debtor with multiple creditors. Knowing
that the debtor does not have enough assets to pay off all of the
debts, creditors want to sue as soon as they can, as whoever first
secures a judgment can access everything in the debtor’s asset
pool to satisfy their claim. 16 After the quicker creditors have
moved, the slower-moving creditors will then take whatever remains in the pool. The process dismantles the debtor and destroys
the synergy in its assets that it enjoyed as a “going concern”—a
continuing business.17 Furthermore, the resources spent on monitoring other creditors can generate more value elsewhere than in
the race to the courthouse—a race in which unsophisticated creditors are disadvantaged.18

13

In re Huang, 275 F3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir 2002).
See Thomas H. Jackson, Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 10–12
(Harvard 1986).
15 See id at 12.
16 See id at 12, 15.
17 See id at 14–15; Barry E. Adler, Douglas G. Baird, and Thomas H. Jackson, Cases,
Problems, and Materials on Bankruptcy 14, 21 (Foundation 2007).
18 See Jackson, Logic and Limits at 15 n 18, 16 (cited in note 14) (“Because of the
‘race,’ many of the special advantages one creditor holds may be worthless. Participation
in or monitoring against the race will be costly for all creditors.”).
14
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The Bankruptcy Code has broadly been thought to attempt
to resolve this issue through what is known as the “creditors’ bargain.”19 Both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 impose a collective proceeding upon everyone and generally prohibit any creditor from
recovering from the debtor outside of that proceeding via an automatic stay.20 Under a Chapter 7 liquidation, the debtor’s assets
are allocated to each creditor pro rata according to its priority status prescribed by law, 21 eliminating the race to the courthouse
and the associated monitoring costs.22 On the other hand, under
a Chapter 11 reorganization, valuable corporate debtors restructure to survive as going concerns and generate revenue, also for
the benefit of the creditors. The certainty of what each creditor
receives in bankruptcy is also valuable for risk-averse creditors.23
Even if a particular creditor might have fared better without
bankruptcy, creditors as a whole benefit from the reduced costs
and certainty of recovery when their claims are resolved collectively in a single forum and paid pro rata per the statutory priority order. And in Chapter 11 cases, successful reorganization allows both the creditors and society to benefit from the debtor’s
revival. But the system’s purpose would be defeated if any creditor could opt out and pursue the self-interested strategy. Hence,
any independent attempt to secure a bankruptcy waiver from the
debtor should be invalid to protect all creditors’ collective interest.
In cases invalidating waivers of rights under the Bankruptcy
Code by either individuals or corporations, courts have justified
their decisions as in the creditors’ collective interest. For example,
in In re Pease,24 the court voided an automatic stay waiver in a
Chapter 11 case. The court reasoned that the waiver would enable the secured party to take the collateral away from the debtor,
which could have helped the debtor successfully reorganize itself

19 This term is widely attributed to the academic scholarship of Professors Thomas
Jackson and Douglas Baird. For the seminal works, see Jackson, 91 Yale L J at 858, 859–
71 (cited in note 10); Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance
Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 Vand L Rev 829, 835–36 (1985). For a recent analysis of
the theory, see generally Anthony Casey, Chapter 11’s Renegotiation Framework and the
Purpose of Corporate Bankruptcy, Colum L Rev (forthcoming 2020), archived at
https://perma.cc/H8JL-HBY8.
20 See 11 USC § 362. See also Douglas G. Baird and Anthony J. Casey, No Exit?
Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 Colum L Rev 1, 3
n 2 (2013).
21 See 11 USC § 507(a).
22 See Jackson, 91 Yale L J at 858, 861–62 (cited in note 10).
23 Jackson, Logic and Limits at 15 (cited in note 14).
24 195 Bankr 431 (Bankr D Neb 1996).
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and thus benefitted other creditors, and concluded that a creditor
may not “opt out of the collective consequences” of bankruptcy.25
The court in In re Trans World Airlines, Inc26 agreed with Pease.
It voided a debtor’s contractual waiver of its right to reject executory contracts under § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code because the
waiver could harm the bankruptcy estate by depriving the debtor
of a Code protection, thus disregarding “other parties with a legitimate interest” in the bankruptcy case.27 If, as the bankruptcy
courts suggest, the creditors’ interest in specific bankruptcy protections is great enough to justify prohibiting waivers of those
protections, their collective interest in not having the entire bankruptcy case rendered pointless by someone opting out must also
be just as strong. As one bankruptcy court put it, “since bankruptcy is designed to produce a system of reorganization and distribution different from [that] under nonbankruptcy law, it would
defeat the purpose of the Code to allow parties to provide by contract that the provisions of the Code should not apply.”28
B. The Misguided “Fresh Start” Rationale
In addition to solving the common pool problem, another major purpose of bankruptcy law is to give an “honest but unfortunate” individual a “fresh start” from past obligations.29 Therefore,
bankruptcy law enables an individual to discharge—in other
words, extinguish—her debts after liquidation of her assets.30 Accordingly, courts have consistently held that individual debtors
may not waive the right to discharge prior to bankruptcy filing.31
25

Id at 433–35.
261 Bankr 103 (Bankr D Del 2001).
27 Id at 114 (listing various decisions holding that a contractual waiver of objection
to a lift stay motion is unenforceable to the extent that it jeopardizes the right of other
parties within the bankruptcy case to enjoy that benefit).
28 In re 203 N LaSalle St Partnership, 246 Bankr 325, 331 (Bankr ND Ill 2000).
29 Local Loan Co v Hunt, 292 US 234, 244 (1934).
30 Id. See also Jackson, Logic and Limits at 225 (cited in note 14). The legislature’s
concern with waivers of the discharge right is embodied in Bankruptcy Code provisions
allowing only postpetition discharge waivers with court approval. See 11 USC §§ 524(c),
727(a)(10); S Rep No 95-989, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 98 (1978) (“[Section 727(a)] is the heart
of the fresh start provisions of the bankruptcy law.”).
31 See, for example, Klingman v Levinson, 831 F2d 1292, 1296 n 3 (7th Cir 1987)
(“For public policy reasons, a debtor may not contract away the right to a discharge in
bankruptcy.”); In re Cole, 226 Bankr 647, 654 (BAP 9th Cir 1998) (“[W]e conclude that a
prepetition waiver of the dischargeability of a debt undermines the purpose of the Code to
give an honest but unfortunate debtor a fresh start.”); In re Weitzen, 3 F Supp 698, 698
(SDNY 1933) (“To sustain a contractual obligation of this character would frustrate the
object of the Bankruptcy Act.”).
26
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But a number of bankruptcy courts have erred in relying on the
fresh start rationale to invalidate both individuals’ and corporations’ bankruptcy waivers.32
The reasons why individuals are entitled to a fresh start are
irrelevant to a business entity.33 First, a corporation’s owners are
not personally liable for its debts beyond their initial capital contributions, even without the aid of bankruptcy.34 Second, the charitable concerns afforded to flesh-and-blood people also do not apply to corporations. Finally, the economic functions that the fresh
start policy serves do not align with bankruptcy principles in the
corporate context. By insulating an individual debtor from prebankruptcy debts, the fresh start policy ensures that creditors
cannot tap the individual’s future earning power forever, thus incentivizing individuals to work hard once they emerge from bankruptcy. 35 But a corporation’s future earning power can only be
measured by the productivity of its existing assets,36 which by definition constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate from which
creditors can draw. 37 Thus, the fresh start justification is illsuited to corporate bankruptcy contexts.
Because the fresh start rationale applies poorly to corporate
bankruptcy cases, we are left with one main reason why the law
prohibits corporate bankruptcy waivers: to protect the creditors’
collective interest in maximized debtor value, reduced costs, and
certainty of recovery resulting from the bankruptcy process.38 This
means that any rule should prohibit uses of golden shares that

32 See In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc, 12 Bankr 989, 1009 (Bankr ND Ga 1980)
(pointing to the fresh start to justify its avoidance of a covenant prohibiting a corporation
from filing bankruptcy); In re Tru Block Concrete Products, Inc, 27 Bankr 486, 492 (Bankr
SD Cal 1983) (holding that a corporation’s bankruptcy waiver is unenforceable as a “well
settled princip[le],” and citing for support four cases which all concern waivers by individuals); In re Shady Grove Tech Center Associates LP, 216 Bankr 386, 389 (Bankr D Md
1998) (stating that “[t]he courts have uniformly held that a waiver of the right to file a
bankruptcy case is unenforceable,” and collecting cases).
33 See Jackson, Logic and Limits at 225 (cited in note 14); Douglas G. Baird and
Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U
Chi L Rev 97, 110 n 45 (1984); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 Mich L Rev 336, 341 (1993).
34 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law 6 (Foundation 3d ed 2015).
35 See Baird and Jackson, 51 U Chi L Rev at 110–11 n 45 (cited in note 33).
36 See id.
37 See 11 USC § 541(a).
38 See Jackson, Logic and Limits at 14 (cited in note 14); Adler, Baird, and Jackson,
Bankruptcy at 14, 21 (cited in note 17).
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would harm that collective interest, but spare the golden shareholders when their actions leave the collective interest intact.
With this in mind, I proceed to explain how golden shareholders
can block bankruptcies.
II. GOLDEN SHARES
This Part discusses how golden shareholders can block a corporation’s bankruptcy by wielding their governance rights.
Part II.A explains the background corporate case law and statutes that confer on corporations the power to file for bankruptcy.
Part II.B discusses how creditors use golden shares, originally a
governmental device to retain control of privatized companies, to
obtain this power.
A. The Authority to File
A corporation can act only through its agents. This is no different when it comes to filing for bankruptcy. Thus, when an
agent files a bankruptcy petition on behalf of their corporation,
the first question a court considers is whether that agent is authorized to file that petition. The Supreme Court answered this
question in Price v Gurney.39 The Court held that state corporate
law—rather than bankruptcy law—grants the authority to file for
bankruptcy on behalf of a corporation, reasoning that “the initiation of the [bankruptcy] proceedings, like the run of corporate activities, is left to the corporation itself, i.e. to those who have the
power of management.”40 In other words, as a governance matter,
a corporation can define the circumstances under which a bankruptcy petition is authorized (and when it will be dismissed for
lack of authority) by setting various conditions on its own ability
to file for bankruptcy, so long as those conditions do not violate
the laws of its state of incorporation.
Corporate law, on the other hand, often gives corporations
significant latitude in deciding how to manage their affairs.41 This

39

324 US 100 (1945).
Id at 104. See also id at 106 (“If the District Court finds that those who purport to
act on behalf of the corporation have not been granted authority by local law to institute
the proceedings, it has no alternative but to dismiss the petition.”).
41 See, for example, Sterling v Mayflower Hotel Corp, 93 A2d 107, 117–18 (Del 1952)
(explaining that a Delaware corporation’s shareholders enjoy great power in deciding corporate charter provisions).
40
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Comment discusses Delaware law because most major corporations incorporate in that state.42 By default, a Delaware corporation’s board of directors manages its affairs.43 But the board’s authority may be limited by the certificate of incorporation,44 which
can contain “any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders.”45 This means that the corporate charter can take away
a power originally vested in the board and give it to shareholders,
including the power to decide for the corporation when to file for
bankruptcy. In other words, the special power of golden shares
comes from the corporation’s charter.
Having examined the legal foundations of golden shares, I
now proceed to discuss the history of golden shares and their
mechanics.
B. The Ascendence of Golden Shares
Golden shares were first popularized in the 1980s during the
privatization of large state-owned corporations in Great Britain.46
These shares vested in the government veto rights over former
state-owned corporations’ governance matters, such as a corporation’s decisions to merge or dispose of material assets, enabling
the government to block foreign control over strategically important enterprises even after it privatized those corporations.47
The distinctive feature of golden shares, then, is the decisive
power over certain corporate affairs given to a shareholder without a controlling financial stake.48
Creditors can use many variations of golden shares to block
a debtor’s bankruptcy filing. For example, golden share provisions
are commonly found in debt workout agreements. In these agreements, in exchange for the share, the creditor agrees to restructure a loan to make it easier for the debtor to pay, often by waiving existing defaults (typically called forbearance). 49 Creditors

42

See Annual Report Statistics (cited in note 9).
See 8 Del Code Ann § 141(a).
44 See 8 Del Code Ann § 141(a).
45 8 Del Code Ann § 102(b)(1) (emphasis added).
46 See Saule T. Omarova, Bank Governance and Systemic Stability: The “Golden
Share” Approach, 68 Ala L Rev 1029, 1044 n 65 (2017).
47 See id at 1044; Alice Pezard, The Golden Share of Privatized Companies, 21
Brooklyn J Intl L 85, 91 (1995).
48 See Omarova, 68 Ala L Rev at 1044 (cited in note 46).
49 See, for example, In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 Bankr 258, 261
(Bankr D Del 2016).
43

1120

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1109

may also insert golden share provisions in agreements that extend a loan or otherwise invest in the debtor corporation.50 These
provisions can come in a variety of forms. 51 Creditors may be
given only one nominal share.52 Alternatively, they may also hold
a significant but noncontrolling stake in the debtor company, say,
49 percent, 53 and wear “two hats” in the corporation. 54 Correspondingly, the debtor may flatly provide in its charter that only
unanimous shareholder consent can authorize a bankruptcy filing. But in a subtler fashion, the debtor may also allow a bankruptcy filing as long as 70 percent of the shareholders consent,
while giving a 35 percent interest to the creditor.55 The creditors
may obtain the shares and vote to amend the charter to give the
shares a veto right in return for financing the debtor’s business
operations. 56 With the initial charter granting them the veto
right, the creditors may have also invested in the corporation
upon its formation and only begun to extend credit after becoming
a shareholder. But under all scenarios, the creditor’s vote is required to authorize the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.

50 See, for example, In re Lexington Hospitality Group, LLC, 577 Bankr 676, 679–80
(Bankr ED Ky 2017).
51 Golden shares can be similar to special purpose entities (SPEs), sometimes called
special purpose vehicles (SPVs). A typical SPE is a subsidiary that buys from its parent
assets that generate regular cash flows, such as mortgages, which it then securitizes and
sells to investors. If the parent files bankruptcy, the SPE is unaffected and its assets will
not be used in the parent’s bankruptcy, thus protecting the SPE’s investors. The SPE also
reduces risks of its own bankruptcy by requiring unanimous board consent for bankruptcy
filings and having an “independent director” whose purpose is to veto any filing. See
Michael J. Cohn, Note, Asset Securitization: How Remote Is Bankruptcy Remote?, 26
Hofstra L Rev 929, 931 (1998); Ayotte and Gaon, 24 Rev Fin Stud at 1300–01 (cited in
note 2); Katherine J. Baudistel, Bankruptcy-Remote Special Purpose Entities: An Opportunity for Investors to Maximize the Value of Their Returns While Undergoing More Careful
and Realistic Risk Analysis, 86 S Cal L Rev 1309, 1313–17 (2013). For an example in case
law, see In re General Growth Properties, Inc, 409 Bankr 43, 49 (Bankr SDNY 2009).
52 See, for example, Intervention Energy Holdings, 553 Bankr at 261.
53 See, for example, In re Franchise Services of North America, Inc, 891 F3d 198, 203
(5th Cir 2018). The Fifth Circuit in that case distinguishes a “golden share” from a 49 percent shareholder, see id at 205, but I include the latter in the former’s definition to streamline the Comment’s organization. “Golden share” is not a term of art and the difference
between the court’s definition and mine does not impact the substance of this Comment.
54 See, for example, In re Global Ship Systems, LLC, 391 Bankr 193, 203 (Bankr SD
Ga 2007) (explaining the situation of a creditor with a golden share who also holds a significant percentage of the debtor’s voting stock).
55 See, for example, Lexington Hospitality Group, 577 Bankr at 680.
56 See, for example, Franchise Services, 891 F3d at 203.
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III. TREATMENT OF GOLDEN SHARES IN COURTS
As discussed in Part II, golden share provisions come in several variations. This Part analyzes the courts’ different approaches to golden share provisions, highlights the rules that
courts employ, and points out the weaknesses of these rules.
Part III.A discusses the “bona fide equity holder” rule—that is, a
creditor can veto a company’s bankruptcy filing if it holds substantial equity in the company and the corporate charter grants
it the veto right as a shareholder. However, this rule tends to create false negatives by letting a bona fide equity holder’s selfinterested veto off the hook. Part III.B discusses the alternative
“fiduciary duty” rule—that is, if the golden shareholder owes fiduciary duties to the company under current law, courts treat its
veto as exercised prima facie in good faith. But this rule creates
false positives by punishing nonfiduciary golden shareholders’ vetoes made in consideration of the company’s best interests. As discussed below, underlying both rules is the inquiry whether a veto
right equals an impermissible bankruptcy waiver. However, to
avoid false positives and negatives, courts should not question the
validity of the veto right per se, but they should scrutinize each
veto exercised under that right.
A. “Bona Fide Equity Holder”
Many courts, recently joined by the Fifth Circuit, draw a distinction between bona fide equity holders, who hold substantial
equity in a company, and mere creditors to decide whether a
golden share provision is valid. 57 Notwithstanding the rule
against bankruptcy waivers, these courts accept that a corporation’s bona fide equity holder has a right, if granted by the corporate charter in accordance with state law, to block the corporation’s bankruptcy filing. 58 As the cases below illustrate, these
courts reason that once the charter vests the right, bankruptcy
law cannot take the right away from the bona fide equity holder
simply because it also happens to be the corporation’s creditor.59
The first two cases below concluded that the golden shareholders
were bona fide equity holders and upheld their bankruptcy veto.
57 See, for example, In re Franchise Services of North America, Inc, 891 F3d 198, 208
(5th Cir 2018); In re Global Ship Systems, LLC, 391 Bankr 193, 203 (Bankr SD Ga 2007);
In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 Bankr 258, 265 (Bankr D Del 2016).
58 See, for example, Franchise Services, 891 F3d at 208–09; Global Ship Systems, 391
Bankr at 203.
59 See Franchise Services, 891 F3d at 208–09.
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The third case concluded that the golden shareholder merely held
a nominal share in the company, and it treated the veto right of
the share as an invalid bankruptcy waiver.
1. In re Franchise Services of North America, Inc.60
The debtor in this case was a Delaware corporation that
sought to acquire another corporation.61 To help finance the acquisition, the debtor entered into a contract with the creditor, an
investment bank. 62 Under the contract, the creditor invested
$15 million in the debtor, in exchange for 100 percent of the
debtor’s preferred shares, equal to a 49.76 percent equity stake in
the debtor.63 As a condition to the investment, the debtor adopted
a new charter providing that it could not file for bankruptcy without the approval of a majority of preferred shareholders, enabling
the creditor to veto its bankruptcy filing.64 The debtor incurred
service fees of $3 million payable to the creditor for its services.65
After the acquisition proved to be a poor decision, the debtor filed
for bankruptcy without conducting a shareholder vote.66 The creditor moved to dismiss the bankruptcy case for lack of authority.67
The Fifth Circuit held that by holding the preferred shares,
the creditor obtained the right to veto bankruptcy filings under
the debtor’s amended charter. 68 Rejecting the argument that
bankruptcy law prohibits the arrangement as a de facto bankruptcy waiver, the court reasoned that the case involved an
amended corporate charter “triggered by a substantial equity investment” of $15 million, rather than an agreement granting a
veto right to a mere creditor in exchange for forbearance of past
defaults. 69 Thus, the charter amendment could not solely be a
“ruse” to ensure the repayment of a $3 million debt when the creditor was a “bona fide equity holder” that invested $15 million in
the debtor.70 The court concluded that nothing in bankruptcy law
compels the court to deprive a corporation’s bona fide equity

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

891 F3d 198 (5th Cir 2018).
Id at 203.
Id.
Id.
Franchise Services, 891 F3d at 203.
Id.
Id at 204.
Id.
Franchise Services, 891 F3d at 205.
Id at 207 (emphasis added).
Id at 208–09.
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holder of its existing voting right in disregard of the corporate
charter just because it also happens to be a creditor of the corporation.71 Furthermore, it held that the creditor was not a controlling shareholder under Delaware law and owed no fiduciary duty
to the debtor in exercising its veto right because the creditor did
not have control over the debtor’s board of directors. 72 And no
bankruptcy law doctrine prohibits the creditor from exercising
the right because of the lack of fiduciary duty per se.73 The court
nonetheless stated that the result might be different if the creditor held no equity stake in the debtor, or obtained equity “as a
ruse to guarantee a debt.”74
2. In re Global Ship Systems, LLC.75
Similar to Franchise Services, the court in this case held that
a creditor’s bankruptcy veto right is valid when it holds substantial equity in the debtor company. The debtor, a Georgia limited
liability company (LLC),76 was organized to purchase a shipyard,
and obtained a secured loan from the creditor to finance the purchase.77 In exchange for the loan, the creditor received Class B
shares equal to a 20 percent interest in the debtor. 78 Upon the
debtor’s formation, its operating agreement 79 prohibited voluntary bankruptcy filings absent the Class B shareholder’s consent,
with the creditor being the sole Class B shareholder.80 This prohibition did not expire upon payment of the loan in full.81 The debtor
solicited its other creditors to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against it to circumvent the creditor’s veto right.82 The court
71

Id.
Franchise Services, 891 F3d at 211–13. Part IV, however, argues that golden
shareholders should be viewed as controlling shareholders by virtue of their actual control
over the debtor’s bankruptcy decision.
73 Id at 209.
74 Id.
75 391 Bankr 193 (Bankr SD Ga 2007).
76 A limited liability company is a popular form of business organization that retains
the corporation’s limited liability feature but typically provides pass-through taxation for
its owners. See Fletcher, Cyclopedia at § 20 (cited in note 9).
77 Global Ship Systems, 391 Bankr at 196–97.
78 Id at 197.
79 As a key formation document and the equivalent to a corporate charter, an operating agreement lays out an LLC’s management and operational rules. See Ijeoma S.
Nwatu, Basic Information About Operating Agreements (US Small Business Administration, May 18, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/KM44-9VY2.
80 Global Ship Systems, 391 Bankr at 199–200.
81 Id at 200.
82 Id at 202.
72
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held that the case was the equivalent of a voluntary case filed by
the debtor itself and was filed in bad faith under § 1112 of the
Bankruptcy Code for disregarding the creditor’s bankruptcy veto
right.83
Among other considerations, the court pointed out that the
creditor wears two hats—both creditor and shareholder—by virtue of holding a substantial equity interest in the debtor.84 Further, the creditor’s right to block bankruptcy granted by the LLC’s
operating agreement was “dependent solely on its status as an
equity holder” rather than a creditor because the right did not expire when the debt was extinguished. 85 While a bankruptcy
waiver obtained by a pure lender violates bankruptcy law, the
creditor’s separate voting right as an equity holder remained
valid as long as Georgia permitted LLCs to make all management
decisions on their own.86
On the other hand, things turn out differently when a creditor never attained the bona fide equity holder status and is technically only a shareholder. As illustrated by the following case,
even if the charter enables such a shareholder to veto the debtor’s
bankruptcy filing, the provision would be deemed an unenforceable bankruptcy waiver.
3. In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC.87
The debtor here, a Delaware LLC, defaulted on a secured loan
extended by the creditor.88 In exchange for waiving all defaults,
the creditor, among other things, required the debtor to amend
its LLC agreement to admit the creditor as a member, and it mandated unanimous member consent for voluntary bankruptcy filings.89 The debtor gave the creditor one common unit (the LLC
equivalent to a common share) in exchange for contributing $1 to
the debtor; including that unit, the debtor had issued 22,000,001
common units in total. 90 The debtor filed for voluntary bankruptcy, and the petition would have been authorized absent the
LLC agreement’s amendment.91
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id at 202–04.
Global Ship Systems, 391 Bankr at 203.
Id at 199–200 (emphasis added).
Id at 204, citing Ga Code Ann § 14-11-304(a).
553 Bankr 258 (Bankr D Del 2016).
Id at 260–61.
Id at 261.
Id at 260–61.
Intervention Energy Holdings, 553 Bankr at 261.
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The court held that the purpose of the parties’ arrangement
was precisely “to contract away the right to seek bankruptcy relief.”92 Because the creditor emphasized in its own motion to dismiss that it “specifically negotiated” the debtor’s ability to file for
bankruptcy,93 the parties clearly intended to reserve the decision
to file for bankruptcy to the creditor.94 The court concluded that
the arrangement at issue was:
[a] provision in a limited liability company governance document obtained by contract, the sole purpose and effect of
which is to place into the hands of a single, minority equity
holder the ultimate authority to eviscerate the right of that
entity to seek federal bankruptcy relief, and the nature and
substance of whose primary relationship with the debtor is
that of creditor—not equity holder—and which owes no duty
to anyone but itself in connection with an LLC’s decision to
seek federal bankruptcy relief.95
Thus, even if Delaware LLC law may permit such a provision, it
was nonetheless “tantamount to an absolute [bankruptcy]
waiver” and hence violated bankruptcy law.96
***
We can surmise from these cases that a bona fide equity
holder must hold a genuine equity interest in the debtor. While
no exact threshold exists (49 percent in Franchise Services and
20 percent in Global Ship Systems sufficed), 97 a creditor must
have a substantial capital contribution backing the equity interest. Thus, a shareholder would likely be a bona fide equity holder
if it bought common shares as one of the corporation’s first investors. On the contrary, if the “shareholder” obtained a nominal
share with at most negligible consideration, or it took merely a
“special” membership in the debtor, then the court would look

92
93
94
95
96
97

Id at 264.
Id.
Id at 265.
Intervention Energy Holdings, 553 Bankr at 265 (emphasis added).
Id.
Franchise Services, 891 F3d at 203; Global Ship Systems, 391 Bankr at 197.
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past the formalities and refuse to acknowledge its equity holder
status.98
Even though the dichotomy between bona fide and nominal
shareholders is intuitive, it can lead to false negatives. Suppose
A is a 30 percent shareholder of B, a fledgling corporation. Upon
incorporation, B’s charter provides that shareholders can veto
bankruptcy filings. B was incorporated in Delaware, whose laws
allow this provision. Understanding that B’s business would
thrive with more capital infusion, A then loaned B a large amount
of money. B eventually filed for bankruptcy without securing A’s
vote. A moved to dismiss.
A court would almost certainly hold that A is a bona fide equity holder and dismiss B’s bankruptcy case for lack of authority.
But if A blocked the bankruptcy because it worried about B being
unable to repay its loan, B and B’s other creditors could be in bad
shape. B would lose the opportunity to get back on its feet through
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Theoretically, other creditors could file
involuntary bankruptcy petitions against B,99 but they may just
be passive investors who have not been actively monitoring B’s
financial health. Such creditors may be unable to bring the case
quickly enough before A moves to collect and diminishes B’s
value. For example, they might hold B’s bonds as part of index
fund portfolios consisting of many companies and managed passively by institutional investors. It would be unimaginable for
these bondholders to have to check how each company in the portfolio is doing. And even if they do file, B could have filed a timely
case more easily anyway, as it would be best positioned to know
when bankruptcy is optimal for everyone given its own financial
condition. Because involuntary cases are intended to force unwilling debtors into bankruptcy, the creditors’ extra monitoring costs
incurred to commence the bankruptcy are wasteful when the
debtor itself actually wants to file. By stripping B of its ability to
file, A is able to block other creditors’ access to bankruptcy’s collective benefit (or at least make it more expensive) for its own
benefit as a creditor.
98 See Intervention Energy Holdings, 553 Bankr at 265; In re Lake Michigan Beach
Pottawattamie Resort, LLC, 547 Bankr 899, 904 (Bankr ND Ill 2016) (describing the position of a creditor admitted as a special member as “separate and apart from the Debtor in
all ways but for its authority to block the Debtor from petitioning for bankruptcy relief”).
99 In reality, involuntary bankruptcy cases are rare. Less than 0.5 percent of the
Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in fiscal year 2018 were commenced by involuntary petitions. See United States Courts, Table 7.2—U.S. Bankruptcy Courts Judicial Facts and
Figures (Sept 30, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/EH3K-9GJV.

2020]

The Golden Share

1127

Having explained the bona fide equity holder rule and its tendency to produce false negatives, I now discuss the fiduciary duty
rule employed by other courts. While this rule avoids the bona fide
equity holder rule’s shortcomings, it creates its own problems.
B. “Fiduciary Duty”
Other courts conclude that fiduciary duties of the vetoing
party are a decisive factor.100 These courts see the existence of fiduciary duty as a safe harbor. Fiduciary duty allows the courts to
assume that each exercise of the bankruptcy veto right is a prima
facie good-faith decision made with the corporation’s interests in
mind. They thus differentiate such a right from a waiver, which
blocks bankruptcy under all circumstances. And because the veto
right is not a bankruptcy waiver, bankruptcy doctrines cannot
render it invalid. 101 Curiously, no court has held that golden
shareholders owe fiduciary duties to the debtor by virtue of their
inherent ability to control the debtor’s bankruptcy decision. The
cases below exemplify this rule by holding that a waiver of fiduciary duties in a golden share clause dooms the entire provision.
However, the fiduciary duty rule creates another problem: false
positives in rejecting good-faith bankruptcy vetoes.
1. In re Lake Michigan Beach Pottawattamie Resort, LLC.102
The debtor, a Michigan LLC, obtained a loan from the creditor secured by the debtor’s main asset.103 After it defaulted, the
debtor amended its operating agreement to admit the creditor as
a “[s]pecial [m]ember” for as long as the loan remained outstanding, in exchange for the creditor’s forbearance. 104 As a special
member, the creditor had the right to veto the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, and it did not have any financial stake in the
debtor. 105 The amended operating agreement further provided
that the special member provision was written “for the express
benefit of” the creditor, who had no duty to consider the debtor or

100 Lake Michigan Beach, 547 Bankr at 914; In re Lexington Hospitality Group, LLC,
577 Bankr 676, 685–86 (Bankr ED Ky 2017).
101 This means that if the veto right was indeed exercised in bad faith, a remedy is
found in corporate law for breach of fiduciary duty. See Franchise Services, 891 F3d
at 214.
102 547 Bankr 899 (Bankr ND Ill 2016).
103 Id at 903.
104 Id at 903–04, 910.
105 Id at 904.
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its members’ interests when exercising its rights. 106 The debtor
filed for bankruptcy after another default to avoid foreclosure,
and the creditor moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of,
among other things, lack of authority.107
The debtor drew an analogy between the arrangement at issue and the permitted practice of “blocking directors” in special
purpose entities (SPEs). 108 Responding to that argument, the
court noted that in an SPE, the bankruptcy blocking mechanism
is located in a “corporate control document,” which the corporate
owners must respect before commencing a bankruptcy case. 109
But an absolute bankruptcy waiver should always be void.110 The
SPE escapes unenforceability by making the blocking director “independent.” The director must adhere to her fiduciary duty to the
SPE, which means she must be able to vote in favor of bankruptcy
(contrary to the interest of the creditor who appointed her) when
filing for bankruptcy is in the SPE’s best interest.111 In this case,
however, the special member expressly waived its fiduciary duties.112 The creditor thus could disregard everybody’s interest but
its own when voting, rendering bankruptcy impossible whenever
it could harm the creditor. The court held that such an arrangement was no different from a bankruptcy waiver unenforceable
under bankruptcy law.113
Unlike the cases using the bona fide equity holder rule, courts
employing the fiduciary duty rule are willing to void a creditor’s
veto right even if the creditor holds substantial equity in the
debtor. However, courts will only take that step if they determine
(1) that the creditor acquired this right solely to ensure its loan
gets repaid and (2) that the creditor would not consider the
debtor’s interests in exercising its right. The following case

106

Lake Michigan Beach, 547 Bankr at 904, 910 (emphasis omitted).
Id at 904, 909.
108 Id at 911. For an explanation of SPEs, see note 51.
109 Lake Michigan Beach, 547 Bankr at 912.
110 Id.
111 Id at 912–13. See also In re General Growth Properties, Inc, 409 Bankr 43, 64
(Bankr SDNY 2009) (“[I]f Movants believed that an ‘independent’ manager can serve on a
board solely for the purpose of voting ‘no’ to a bankruptcy filing because of the desires of a
secured creditor, they were mistaken.”).
112 Lake Michigan Beach, 547 Bankr at 914.
113 Id. Separately, Michigan LLC law requires that members owe fiduciary duties to
each other. Therefore, the amended provision was void under Michigan law as well. See
id, citing Mich Comp Laws Ann § 450.4404.
107
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applies this test, with the court invalidating a golden share provision when the golden shareholder bargained for the provision
only to exercise it in its own favor as a creditor.
2. In re Lexington Hospitality Group, LLC.114
The debtor, a Kentucky LLC, obtained a secured loan from
the creditor to acquire a hotel and simultaneously amended its
operating agreement.115 The amended operating agreement provided that the creditor’s subsidiary was admitted as a 30 percent
member of the debtor until the debtor repaid the loan,116 and it
required authorization of an “[i]ndependent [m]anager” and the
consent of 75 percent of its members to declare bankruptcy.117 The
independent manager would no longer have her role upon loan
repayment; she was further instructed to consider the interests of
the creditors in voting, and her fiduciary duty to other LLC members was “eliminate[d].”118 The creditor also had an express right
to veto the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.119 After defaulting on the
loan, the debtor transferred another 20 percent of its interests to
the creditor’s subsidiary in exchange for the creditor’s forbearance.120 The debtor soon filed for bankruptcy.121
The court held that the creditor “imposed” the provisions at
issue, which eliminated the debtor’s right to file for bankruptcy
without the creditor’s consent, and was thus different from an
agreement “among” the debtor’s members to only file for bankruptcy under certain conditions.122 The court reached this conclusion for three reasons. First, the provisions were a condition of
the loan.123 Second, the independent manager was linked to the
loan and not truly independent from the creditor because she

114

577 Bankr 646 (Bankr ED Ky 2017).
Id at 679–80.
116 Id at 680.
117 Id at 680.
118 Lexington Hospitality Group, 577 Bankr at 680–81.
119 Id at 681.
120 Id at 681–82.
121 Id at 682.
122 Lexington Hospitality Group, 577 Bankr at 684. See also In re Squire Court Partners LP, 574 Bankr 701, 708 (ED Ark 2017):
115

It is one thing to look past corporate governance documents and the structure of
a corporation when a creditor has negotiated authority to veto a debtor’s decision
to file a bankruptcy petition; it is quite another to ignore those documents when
the owners retain for themselves the decision whether to file [for] bankruptcy.
123

Lexington Hospitality Group, 577 Bankr at 684.
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waived her fiduciary duty to the debtor’s members.124 Third, the
creditor, owing no fiduciary duty to the debtor, could block bankruptcy using either its veto power or its control of the subsidiary,
without which the members could not reach the 75 percent
threshold.125 The only purpose of these provisions was to frustrate
the debtor’s ability to file for bankruptcy and therefore to ensure
repayment of the creditor’s loan, amounting to an invalid bankruptcy waiver.126
C. Comparing the Two Rules
While the fiduciary duty rule eliminates the false negatives
that the bona fide equity holder rule produces by punishing
golden shareholders that exploit their veto rights, the fiduciary
duty rule has the opposite problem: it can produce false positives.
Let us return to the previous hypothetical in which A, a 30 percent shareholder and a creditor of corporation B, wants to veto B’s
bankruptcy petition by invoking a golden share provision in B’s
charter. Courts likely would not hold that A owes a fiduciary duty
to B because A does not hold a majority of B’s voting shares. When
the safe harbor of fiduciary duty is absent, courts tend to equate
a creditor’s bankruptcy veto right with absolute bankruptcy waivers.127 The problem is that A may very well have moved to dismiss
because there is a good reason why bankruptcy is not a wise
choice for B: for example, bankruptcy generates bad publicity and
A is confident in its plan to turn around B’s business without help
from the bankruptcy court. Besides, under corporate law, A is entitled to vote on B’s bankruptcy as a shareholder. Flatly invalidating A’s vote not only precludes fair business decisions, but also
disregards state law.
To avoid such false positives, a court might attempt to finetune the approach by invalidating A’s veto right only when its
“sole purpose and effect”128 is to block bankruptcy for A’s benefit
as a creditor. But this is just replacing a per se rule with a fuzzy
standard. While B’s charter—which innocuously grants every
common shareholder a bankruptcy veto right among other voting
rights—may pass this test, courts can easily produce inconsistent
124

Id at 684–85.
Id at 685–86.
126 Id at 686.
127 See Lake Michigan Beach, 547 Bankr at 914; Lexington Hospitality Group, 577
Bankr at 685–86.
128 Intervention Energy Holdings, 553 Bankr at 265 (emphasis added).
125

2020]

The Golden Share

1131

results in closer cases.129 Additionally, like the bona fide equity
holder test, this test does little to prevent a bad-faith bankruptcy
veto on A’s part in our first hypothetical. Lastly, this approach
means the court needs to decide whether A would always exercise
the right to veto bankruptcy only when it is against A’s interest
as a creditor (not just that A can veto). This analysis is bound to
be contrived because it implies, rather problematically, that a
court can predict how a particular party will behave in the future.
As discussed above, the bona fide equity holder rule that permits substantial stockholders’ bankruptcy veto rights facilitates
self-interested vetoes. On the other hand, the fiduciary duty rule
that carves out a safe harbor only for veto rights held by fiduciaries tends to punish good-faith vetoes by nonfiduciary golden
shareholders. As Part I showed, the rule against bankruptcy
waivers is really about prohibiting any single creditor from opting
out of bankruptcy to recover its claim at every other creditor’s expense. An ideal approach would be to invalidate a golden shareholder’s bankruptcy veto when it uses the veto only to benefit itself as a creditor, regardless of the harm to all the creditors’
collective interest.130 At the same time, courts need to allow the
golden shareholder’s veto if it is a rational business decision made
by an entitled decisionmaker per the corporate charter, as this
both respects corporate law and allows the debtor to benefit from
good judgments. The existing approaches, when taken to extremes, either fail to punish the former or tend to deter the latter.
Invariably focusing on determining ex ante whether a veto right
at issue is an impermissible bankruptcy waiver, the current approaches consistently permit or prohibit acts exercising that right
for any reason once the courts conclude the right is valid or void.
To avoid false positives and negatives, courts should instead
determine ex post whether to allow a specific veto exercised under
that right. But courts cannot make that determination under the
current bankruptcy law framework, which always asks whether
129 Practitioners generally agree on the difficulty in advising clients of a possible
golden share provision’s validity, given the current rules. The following articles exemplify
their attempts to clarify the tests and predict future court rulings. See generally Jay M.
Goffman and Christine A. Okike, A Golden Share and the Conflict Between Freedom of
Contract and Federal Policy, 257 NY L J (June 12, 2017); Mark A. Cody and Mark G.
Douglas, Fifth Circuit Rules That Corporate Charter Provision Requiring Shareholder
Consent for Bankruptcy Filing Is Enforceable but Declines to Rule on Validity of “Golden
Shares” (Jones Day, Oct 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/8ZDT-2K9A; Shmuel Vasser,
Fool’s Gold? Circuit Court Taking Up Alternative Bankruptcy Proofing Mechanism (Asset
Securitization Report, Mar 27, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/257Y-SN6C.
130 See Part I; Part IV.A.
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there is a waiver first—conceptually, a waiver corresponds to a
right (to enforce that waiver), rather than a specific act exercising
that right. The next Part argues that to conduct this ex post inquiry, courts should impose on golden shareholders fiduciary duties to the debtor in deciding whether to veto and examine
whether they exercised each veto in violation of the duties. It further explains that the controlling shareholder principles from corporate law would provide the legal framework for imposing such
duties.
IV. A CORPORATE LAW FRAMEWORK BASED ON FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
As explained above, courts cannot straightforwardly apply
bankruptcy law to bankruptcy waivers to decide whether acts exercising power under golden share provisions are legitimate. Rather, a framework that applies controlling shareholder principles
from corporate law is a better fit. Specifically, I propose that a
golden shareholder who is concurrently a creditor of a corporation
should be viewed as a controlling shareholder under corporate law
with respect to the debtor’s decision to file for bankruptcy because
it exercises “actual control” over that decision. As a controlling
shareholder, then, the golden shareholder owes fiduciary duties
to the debtor when it uses its veto power. This means that when
deciding whether to veto the debtor’s bankruptcy filing after the
debtor becomes insolvent, the golden shareholder should always
make the decision that would maximize the debtor’s value for all
its creditors. This novel framework departs from the approach
courts take, which never finds that golden shareholders are controlling shareholders and thus does not impose fiduciary duties
on them. This is because the courts usually examine control over
the company’s board in deciding controller status for a minority
shareholder. But they have misapplied that test in golden shareholder contexts and ignored that the controller status hinges on
the shareholder’s actual control over a corporate decision.
My framework’s mechanics work as follows: A debtor company’s golden share provision itself would be valid as long as it
approves the provision in compliance with its charter and bylaws.
But if the golden shareholder attempts to veto the debtor’s bankruptcy filing in a shareholder vote, the debtor’s creditors may sue
the golden shareholder in state court for breach of the duty of loyalty in a controlling shareholder transaction. In that litigation, so
long as the court determines that the golden shareholder has a

2020]

The Golden Share

1133

conflict of interest in the vote, 131 it would then examine that
shareholder’s actions under the entire fairness test, which
Delaware courts employ to examine transactions involving potential breaches of the duty of loyalty.132 If the veto fails to be entirely
fair, the plaintiff would be entitled to either void the transaction—that is, to enjoin the veto—and proceed to file for bankruptcy, or obtain as damages the expected value it would have
derived from the bankruptcy case had the veto not been exercised.
This Part first explains the legal doctrines that enable a court to
view the golden shareholder as a controlling shareholder, and impose on it fiduciary duties to the corporation’s creditors when the
corporation is insolvent. Second, it addresses arguments against
viewing a golden shareholder as a controlling shareholder, and it
explains that the framework works even when the debtor is an
LLC and thus able to waive fiduciary duties. Third, it lays out
factors that a court may consider in finding fiduciary duty violations. Finally, it argues that the approach will discourage creditors from using golden shares for their own benefit.
A. Creditors May Sue for Breach of Fiduciary Duty upon a
Debtor’s Insolvency
It is settled law in Delaware “that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation.”133 This means the directors should make
business decisions in good faith aimed at maximizing the corporation’s value.134 But because corporate personhood is a legal fiction, applying this rule to a specific corporation’s fiduciaries requires us to ask which stakeholders in that corporation the duty
actually benefits.

131

See note 171 and accompanying text.
See Weinberger v UOP, Inc, 457 A2d 701, 710 (Del 1983) (“When [fiduciaries] of a
Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate
their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.”).
133 North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc v Gheewalla,
930 A2d 92, 101 (Del 2007) (emphasis added), citing Guth v Loft, Inc, 5 A2d 503, 510
(Del 1939).
134 See Shlensky v Wrigley, 237 NE2d 776, 778–81 (Ill App 1968) (surveying case law
standing for the proposition that directors must act in shareholders’ best interests but
cabining courts’ review of such action); Production Resources Group, LLC v NCT Group,
Inc, 863 A2d 772, 791 (Del Chanc 2004). See also Douglas G. Baird and M. Todd
Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 Stan L Rev 1309, 1327–28 (2008) (comparing directors’ obligation to maximize value for shareholders with trustees’ obligation to maximize
value for beneficiaries).
132
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When the corporation is financially healthy, the shareholders
benefit from the fiduciary duties as residual owners. 135 But
Delaware case law has established that when the corporation becomes insolvent, the creditors obtain standing to sue derivatively
for fiduciary duty breaches. The Court of Chancery first reasoned
in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Pathe Communications
Corp136 that when the corporation is operating in the “vicinity of
insolvency,” the board of directors owes a duty to the “community
of interest that sustained the corporation,” as opposed to the
shareholders only.137 This duty compels the directors to exercise
good-faith judgment to “maximize the corporation’s long-term
wealth creating capacity” rather than considering only the shareholders’ benefit when dealing with the corporation’s assets.138 In
Production Resources Group, LLC v NCT Group, Inc,139 the court
further explained why creditors stand in the shareholders’ shoes
upon actual insolvency. By the very nature of insolvency, shareholders cannot receive any residual value because the creditors’
claims cannot be satisfied even after all the corporate assets are
liquidated. This means the creditors now replace the shareholders insofar as they directly bear the risk of unwise or disloyal business decisions.140
In North American Catholic Educational Programming
Foundation, Inc v Gheewalla, 141 the Delaware Supreme Court
clarified that fiduciary duty does not shift to the creditors after
the corporation’s insolvency, nor is there a legally meaningful
“zone of insolvency” during which the directors’ duties might
change.142 Rather, upon insolvency, creditors acquire standing to
sue derivatively for fiduciary duty breaches on behalf of the corporation as the “principal constituency injured by any fiduciary
135 Residual owners get everything left in a company after all its debts are paid. When
the company is solvent, whether it does well matters to the shareholders because they get
all the upside of good governance decisions, while creditors are paid off with the fixed
amount of what they are owed. Therefore, fiduciaries answer to the shareholders when
the corporation is financially healthy. See Gheewalla, 930 A2d at 101–02.
136 1991 WL 277613 (Del Chanc).
137 Id at *34.
138 Id. If the board were to vindicate only the shareholders’ interests when the corporation owes more debt than what it is worth, the court reasoned, the board would make
risky businesses decisions that may bring the corporation huge gains or cause it to lose
everything because shareholders would get nothing anyway if the board played it safe,
even when playing it safe maximizes the corporation’s expected value. Id at *34 n 55.
139 863 A2d 772 (Del Chanc 2004).
140 Id at 791.
141 930 A2d 92 (Del 2007).
142 Id at 101.
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breaches that diminish the firm’s value,”143 just like shareholders
in a healthy company. In the bankruptcy veto context, because
filing bankruptcy can be either good or bad for an insolvent corporation, as long as the fiduciary made the decision not to file in
good faith, courts generally will defer to the fiduciary’s business
judgment. However, if the decision is made only to benefit the fiduciary as a creditor, then the creditor is potentially in violation
of its duty of loyalty to the company. Then, the creditor is not entitled to protection if the decision harms the corporation. Therefore, if a golden shareholder owes fiduciary duties to the debtor,
another creditor may sue a golden shareholder who vetoed the
debtor’s bankruptcy in its self-interest for breach of the duty of
loyalty. Then, the court will examine whether the veto is entirely
fair to the debtor. 144 The next Section explains that the golden
shareholder indeed owes such fiduciary duties by being a controlling shareholder.
B. Golden Shareholders Owe Fiduciary Duties to Debtors as
Controlling Shareholders
Shareholders of a Delaware corporation generally owe no fiduciary duty to each other and can act exclusively in their own
interests.145 But there are two exceptions. “[A] shareholder owes
a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or exercises
control over the business affairs of the corporation.”146 For a minority shareholder to become a “controlling minority shareholder,”147 and hence the corporation’s fiduciary, the shareholder
must dominate the corporation “through actual control of corporation conduct.” 148 Delaware courts have held that a minority
shareholder does not need to exercise general control over all aspects of a corporation’s affairs to be controlling. Instead, as long
as the shareholder exerts “actual control with regard to the particular transaction that is being challenged,” the shareholder is

143

Id at 101–02, quoting Production Resources, 863 A2d at 294 n 67.
See Weinberger, 457 A2d at 710.
145 See Ivanhoe Partners v Newmont Mining Corp, 535 A2d 1334, 1344 (Del 1987),
citing Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A2d 946, 958 (Del 1985).
146 Id (emphasis added).
147 Franchise Services, 891 F3d at 211.
148 Citron v Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp, 569 A2d 53, 70 (Del 1989). See also
In re Sea-Land Corp Shareholders Litigation, 1988 WL 49126, *3 (Del Chanc) (“A [minority] stockholder is not deemed controlling unless it . . . has exercised actual domination
and control in directing the corporation’s business affairs.”).
144
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controlling and assumes fiduciary duty as to that transaction.149
By extension, golden shareholders can be the corporation’s fiduciaries as long as they exercise actual control over the corporation’s decision to not file for bankruptcy. Since a golden shareholder can veto a debtor’s bankruptcy filings, the veto allows it to
exercise actual control over the debtor’s bankruptcy decision, and
that alone should make it a fiduciary to the debtor.
Imposing fiduciary duties on golden shareholders eliminates
the false positive and negative problems. Courts now can examine
ex post whether each golden shareholder’s veto violates these duties case by case. In this way, courts can invalidate self-interested
decisions and preserve those made in good faith for the debtor
corporation.
C. Addressing Counterarguments to Imposing Controller
Fiduciary Duties on Golden Shareholders
This Section addresses two potential counterarguments deriving from Delaware Court of Chancery decisions that may obstruct imposing fiduciary duties on golden shareholders and explains why those counterarguments are ultimately inapplicable.
The first counterargument is that the test for determining controlling shareholder status should focus on the shareholder’s control over the board. The second counterargument is that the
shareholder should not owe fiduciary duties for a veto right that
it bargained for as part of a contract. This Section also addresses
the scenario in which the debtor is an LLC and thus able to waive
fiduciary duties, and explains that because such duties cannot be
waived regarding the LLC’s creditors, corporations are unable to
circumvent the proposed rule by converting to LLCs.

149 Williamson v Cox Communications, Inc, 2006 WL 1586375, *4 (Del Chanc) (emphasis added). See also In re Western National Corp Shareholders Litigation, 2000 WL
710192, *20 (Del Chanc); In re Primedia Inc Derivative Litigation, 910 A2d 248, 257
(Del Chanc 2006) (“[T]he plaintiffs need not demonstrate that KKR oversaw the day-today operations of Primedia. Allegations of control over the particular transaction at issue
are enough.”).
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1. The “board control” test of controllers is inapplicable to
golden shareholders.
The Delaware Court of Chancery realizes that determining
actual control is a fact-intensive inquiry.150 Many cases have examined primarily one factor, the shareholder’s control of the
board of directors, in determining actual control, notwithstanding
that the inquiry should be flexible and fact intensive.151 This approach originates from the seminal Delaware case Kahn v Lynch
Communication Systems, Inc.152 Courts solidified the inquiry in
later cases that similarly dealt with freeze-out mergers—that is,
a controlling shareholder’s proposal to buy the rest of the corporation’s shares. 153 Courts subject a freeze-out merger to the
heightened entire fairness test out of concern that the board and
the minority shareholders likely approved the merger due to their
fear of the controlling shareholder’s retaliation rather than their
independent judgment. 154 For example, the controlling shareholder can replace a dissenting board, and the minority shareholders can end up with less liquid, and hence less valuable,
shares if they hold out against the proposal. Minority shareholders can even end up accepting an unfair price from the controlling
150 See In re KKR Financial Holdings LLC Shareholder Litigation, 101 A3d 980, 993
(Del Chanc 2014) (analyzing a variety of facts one by one in a totality of the circumstances
inquiry); In re Morton’s Restaurant Group, Inc Shareholders Litigation, 74 A3d 656, 665
(Del Chanc 2013) (same).
151 See Basho Technologies Holdco B, LLC v Georgetown Basho Investors, LLC, 2018
WL 3326693, *26–28 (Del Chanc) (identifying factors that indicate actual control, including the exercise of veto rights as to corporate governance decisions); In re Cysive, Inc
Shareholders Litigation, 836 A2d 531, 550–51 (Del Chanc 2003) (noting the fact-intensive
nature of the inquiry, but emphasizing that “the question of whether the large block holder
has ‘control’ may be relevant [to], and intertwined with, the question of whether the merger was approved by uncoerced, independent directors”) (emphasis added).
152 638 A2d 1110, 1114–15 (Del 1994).
153 See KKR Financial Holdings, 101 A3d at 988–89; Morton’s Restaurant Group, 74
A3d at 660; In re PNB Holding Co Shareholders Litigation, 2006 WL 2403999, *1
(Del Chanc); In re Tesla Motors, Inc Stockholder Litigation, 2018 WL 1560293, *8–11
(Del Chanc).
154 See, for example, PNB Holding, 2006 WL 2403999 at *9:

Delaware caselaw in [controlling shareholder cases] (that is, the Lynch line of
jurisprudence) has been premised on the notion that when a controller wants
the rest of the shares, the controller’s power is so potent that independent directors and minority stockholders cannot freely exercise their judgment, fearing
retribution from the controller.
See also, for example, In re Pure Resources, Inc, Shareholders Litigation, 808 A2d 421, 441
(Del Chanc 2002) (“[T]he overriding concern of Lynch is the controlling shareholders have
the ability to take retributive action in the wake of rejection by an independent board, a
special committee, or the minority shareholders.”).
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shareholder to prevent further loss.155 Therefore, in this context,
whether the shareholder in question really deprived the board of
its free will becomes the key to deciding whether the shareholder
is a controller and entire fairness review should apply.
Relying on the board control test, the Fifth Circuit in Franchise Services held that the golden shareholder was not controlling because the debtor’s board was able and willing to authorize
the bankruptcy filing without having the shareholders vote on the
issue.156 It equated actual control with board control without offering a justification. But mechanically transplanting the board
control test from the freeze-out merger context to the golden share
context is inappropriate. Rather than preventing bad board actions (compelled merger approvals), the goal of testing the legitimacy of a golden share veto is to prevent bad shareholder actions
(self-interested bankruptcy vetoes). In contrast to freeze-out mergers, courts are not worried about the board being too afraid of
the golden shareholder to approve any bankruptcy filing, as board
approval does not matter when the golden shareholder can bypass
the board and veto an approved filing.157 To prevent outcomes that
favor one shareholder at the corporation’s expense, courts need to
interrogate a board’s independence from that shareholder only
when the board can influence that decision. For purposes of the
inquiry, at least with respect to the golden shareholder veto,
courts can skip the inquiry into the board’s independence and directly scrutinize the shareholder when the shareholder alone controls that decision and the board can do nothing about it.
2. “Contractual rights” are not a ground for denying
fiduciary duties.
Another potential counterargument is that the golden shareholder should not owe fiduciary duties to shareholders for exercising the veto right that it bargained and already paid consideration for. The Superior Vision Services, Inc v ReliaStar Life

155 See Pure Resources, 808 A2d at 441–42 (explaining how such offers create a “prisoner’s dilemma” for minority stockholders).
156 Franchise Services, 891 F3d at 211 (“In making [the controlling shareholder] determination, Delaware courts focus on control of the board.”); id at 213 (applying the board
control test to the facts).
157 Mergers require board approval to be carried out, see 8 Del Code Ann § 251(b), so
any approval should be an independent decision not corrupted by the controller. But when
approval cannot prevent self-interested outcomes anyway, the focus on approval is
misdirected.
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Insurance Co158 court made a similar argument. In that case, the
court held that a shareholder should not owe fiduciary duties for
exercising a contractual right to decide on a corporate affair because fiduciary duty would limit the right that it legitimately bargained for and hence frustrate the parties’ freedom to contract.159
One may thus argue that the golden shareholder’s bankruptcy
veto right, arguably also obtained through the “nexus of contracts”160 among shareholders embodied in the corporate charter,
should not give rise to fiduciary duties.
This argument overlooks the distinction between a right to
veto in a shareholder vote provided in the charter and that in a
standalone contract. The distinction is not merely formalistic and
is probably the true reason underlying the Superior Vision
Services holding. If the debtor files bankruptcy in defiance of a
veto right granted by the charter, the golden shareholder can enjoin the filing on the grounds that the corporation did not conduct
the shareholder vote required in the charter and thus lacks capacity to file;161 by contrast, if the right is granted by a separate
contract, its remedy would be contractual—namely, damages.
Therefore, actual control of the debtor’s bankruptcy does not exist
as to a contractual right, but it exists when the right is grounded
in the charter. And under Delaware law, fiduciary duties vest in
a shareholder when the shareholder exercises actual control.162
One cannot logically argue, then, that those duties do not exist because they are not part of what the parties explicitly bargained for. The whole point of fiduciary duty is that, to maximize
the value of the corporation as a whole, whoever monopolizes
decision-making power should not exploit the decision to the corporation’s detriment.163 If a shareholder who controls an important
corporate decision (such as bankruptcy) were able to disclaim fiduciary duties merely because it paid for its shares, the corporation
would be rendered a mere funnel through which the controller
channels minority shareholders’ money into its own pocket.

158

2006 WL 2521426 (Del Chanc).
Id at *4–5.
160 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum L
Rev 1416, 1426 (1989).
161 See 8 Del Code Ann § 124; Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v
Volgenau, 2012 WL 4038509, *3 (Del Chanc) (“A challenge to the validity of an action or
to the corporation’s capacity to undertake the action seeks to make the action void. It is a
claim that the act could not occur.”).
162 See Citron, 569 A2d at 70 (Del 1989).
163 See Guth, 5 A2d at 510.
159
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3. LLCs cannot waive fiduciary duties as to creditors.
Many debtors that adopt golden share provisions are not corporations, but LLCs.164 While grounded in corporate law principles, this Comment’s approach applies equally well to LLC debtors. Because default fiduciary duties to LLCs are governed by the
same rule as those for corporations,165 an LLC’s creditors also become fiduciary duty beneficiaries upon the LLC’s insolvency. But
unlike a corporation’s fiduciaries,166 an LLC’s members can freely
waive fiduciary duties to each other in the LLC’s operating agreement.167 One might argue that this Comment’s proposed rule invites opportunistic behavior: a corporation in the zone of insolvency can always switch to the LLC form and waive all fiduciary
duties, enabling its golden shareholder to do what it wants with
impunity.
However, Delaware’s LLC Act provides that any fiduciary
duty owed to a party “bound by” the LLC’s operating agreement
can be waived.168 Thus, a healthy LLC’s residual claimants, who
are its members, cannot sue for duty breaches if there is such a
waiver because all members necessarily have executed and thus
are bound by the operating agreement. But the provision is inapplicable to the residual claimants of an insolvent LLC—its creditors—most of whom have no reason to sign the operating agreement and may have never even seen it.
One might argue that even if the waiver itself does not apply
to all creditors, by lending money to an LLC that has waived fiduciary duties and has a golden shareholder, a creditor consents
to the waiver and should not complain if the golden shareholder
later vetoes bankruptcy for its own interest. Indeed, if all creditors agree to opt out of bankruptcy in this way, then it might
make sense to leave them alone.169 But when a debtor corporation
164 See generally, for example, Lake Michigan Beach, 547 Bankr 899; Global Ship
Systems, 391 Bankr 193.
165 See 6 Del Code Ann § 18-1104.
166 Delaware corporate law expressly prohibits corporations from waiving fiduciaries’
liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty, see 8 Del Code Ann § 102(b)(7)(i), or for any
breach committed in bad faith, see 8 Del Code Ann § 102(b)(7)(ii).
167 See 6 Del Code Ann § 18-1101(c); Miller v HCP & Co, 2018 WL 656378, *2
(Del Chanc) (explaining that LLC members may forgo fiduciary duties only by express waiver).
168 6 Del Code Ann § 18-1101(c).
169 The reason why courts should leave consented creditors alone, then, would be that
if the risk of nonrecovery upon insolvency caused by bankruptcy veto rights is truly damaging, creditors would not lend money to debtors with golden share provisions. The market
will thus deter companies from adopting these provisions if they want to raise money, and
the law does not need to invalidate them to frustrate freedom of contract.
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opportunistically converts to an LLC to waive the duties, its creditors could not have consented to the waiver provision because
they extended loans before it was adopted, 170 and the debtor
would thus be unable to evade the duties.
D. Determining Conflicts of Interest
A controlling shareholder transaction triggers entire fairness
review only if that shareholder has a conflict of interest in the
transaction.171 However, while creditors replace the shareholders to
become the primary residual owners upon insolvency, Delaware
courts hold that a fiduciary does not become conflicted merely because it makes decisions favoring equity over debt.172 Thus, entire

This argument raises issues that may be topics of another full-fledged paper. That
paper would need to first address whether putting the golden share provision in the charter (or in case of LLCs, the operating agreement) is indeed such a transparent process that
every creditor really is aware of the provision when lending its money. This is by no means
certain given that many are nonmonitoring investors following the passive strategy to invest in the entire market. And even if they are fully informed of the provision, is it okay
for bankruptcy law to leave the creditors alone as long as they believe that expected returns from the loan justify the risk of nonrecovery in case of insolvency? For one thing,
people tend to discount future risks and overestimate present gains, so not only individual
creditors can make unwise decisions, but courts may also end up permitting behavior
much more harmful to society than in each creditor’s original perception.
Finally, even assuming every creditor is capable of calculating precisely the risks
and returns, this would send courts and commentators back to the familiar and unsettled
question of whether all relevant parties can be trusted to devise a good enough alternative
procedure together so that they are allowed to contract out of bankruptcy. For discussion
of parties’ ability (or lack thereof) to make informed, contractual decisions about bankruptcy, see generally, for example, Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J L
& Econ 127 (1997); Lynn M. LoPucki, Essay, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan
Schwartz, 109 Yale L J 317 (1999).
170 Presumably, creditors can bargain with the LLC ex ante to require it to not waive
fiduciary duty or adopt golden share provisions in future. We can imagine large institutional secured lenders negotiating this. But not all of them can do that, and one purpose
of bankruptcy law is precisely to protect the interests of (unsecured) creditors with no such
bargaining power from the secured creditor who tries to enforce its claim at the expense
of the corporation’s aggregate value. See Jackson, 91 Yale L J at 864–65, 868–70 (cited in
note 10).
171 See In re Synthes, Inc Shareholder Litigation, 50 A3d 1022, 1034 (Del Chanc 2012)
(“Under venerable and sound authority, the plaintiffs must plead that [the controlling
shareholder] had a conflicting interest in the [transaction] in the sense that he derived a
personal financial benefit ‘to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders.’”), quoting Sinclair Oil Corp v Levien, 280 A2d 717, 720 (Del 1971).
172 See Quadrant Structured Products Co, Ltd v Vertin, 102 A3d 155, 191–92
(Del Chanc 2014). The court held that because shareholders are still residual claimants of
the corporation and only secondary to creditors, their interests are supposed to be aligned.
Id. Holding that an equity-favoring business decision is conflicted per se risks interfering
with the board’s good-faith judgment as to whether a riskier or safer strategy is the best
for the firm, which should be within the ambit of the business judgment rule.
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fairness can seldom apply to a veto of a bankruptcy filing made
by a golden shareholder holding only equity and no debt. But
when the golden shareholder is also a creditor of the corporation,
risks of interestedness are much more pronounced.
As a creditor, the golden shareholder wants to be repaid as
much as possible. It probably does not like bankruptcy because
the automatic stay prohibits all individual collection actions
against the debtor. The golden shareholder could have filed suit
first and been fully repaid from everything in the debtor’s asset
pool, but it would then be forced to share the pool with other creditors if bankruptcy is filed. If its debt is secured, the collateral
may depreciate during the bankruptcy process, and it may be
“confiscated” for use in the debtor’s reorganization. 173 On the
other hand, bankruptcy can be good for an insolvent corporation
for various reasons. We thus can easily imagine a golden shareholder, for its own gain, blocking a bankruptcy that would benefit
the corporation if filed, and this is precisely the type of interested
transaction that the entire fairness test aims to screen out. Drawing on the facts of the cases on golden shares, I now lay out several
nonexhaustive factors that help determine whether a golden
shareholder is materially interested174 so as to trigger the entire
fairness review.
1. The amount of equity versus debt held by the golden
shareholder.
A golden shareholder can be interested only when the corporation owes it so much money that bankruptcy does more injury
to the golden shareholder’s loan than good to that shareholder as
the corporation’s residual owner. The Fifth Circuit in Franchise
Services pointed out that it “strains credulity to believe” that the
creditor invested $15 million for a golden share just to make sure
its $3 million bill would be paid.175 When the golden shareholder
holds more equity stake but less debt, it becomes less certain that
its bankruptcy veto was made to collect on that debt rather than
made to launch a risky business plan and reap a large portion of
the boosted company value via equity. In the latter case, the
173

See Ayotte and Gaon, 24 Rev Fin Stud at 1307 (cited in note 2).
See Cede & Co v Technicolor, Inc, 634 A2d 345, 358 (Del 1993) (explaining that for
entire fairness to apply, the plaintiff must “establish that any director’s self-interest was
individually, or collectively, so ‘material’ as to persuade a trier of fact that the independence of the board ‘as a whole’ had been compromised”).
175 Franchise Services, 891 F3d at 208.
174
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golden shareholder’s interests are aligned with the residual
claimants—either creditors or shareholders.
2. The nature of the debt and ease of collection.
Besides the amount of debt and equity at stake in a potential
bankruptcy case, the golden shareholder can be interested due to
the fact that it could have collected more outside of bankruptcy.
For example, as discussed above, the golden shareholder is more
willing to collect outside of bankruptcy if it is a large institutional
lender that has the resources to negotiate a secured loan and sue
to foreclose on the collateral upon default.176 That is less likely to
be the case if the creditor is just an ordinary unsecured creditor177
who does not monitor the company’s financial condition or lacks
the legal resources to bring a timely collection action and win the
race to the courthouse. In the latter case, recovery under bankruptcy is at least as good as without bankruptcy, so the bankruptcy veto exercised would not be due to a misaligned incentive
as a creditor.
3. The context of a golden share provision’s adoption.
The above factors illustrate the reasons why bankruptcy can
objectively be undesirable for the golden shareholder; but the
most telling evidence of interestedness need only show that the
golden shareholder does not desire bankruptcy for some reason
linked to its self-interest as a creditor. Context surrounding the
adoption of the golden share provision sheds light on the parties’
intention. For example: (1) Was the provision adopted concurrently with a loan or forbearance agreement,178 so that it is likely
to have been made in exchange for the loan/forbearance?179 (2) Did
the golden shareholder specifically mention the need to avoid
bankruptcy in the loan negotiations, or “coerce” the corporation
to adopt the provision?180 (3) Is the provision designed to expire

176 See, for example, Lake Michigan Beach, 547 Bankr at 903–04 (deciding a case in
which a large secured creditor vetoed bankruptcy).
177 In reality, unsecured golden shareholders are rare because someone without the
leverage to even bargain for a security interest for its loan would also have a hard time
getting a powerful share with a veto right.
178 For an explanation of forbearance, see Part II.B. See also Intervention Energy
Holdings, 553 Bankr at 261.
179 See, for example, Lexington Hospitality Group, 577 Bankr at 681–82.
180 See, for example, In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC, 2010 WL 4925811, *3 (BAP
10th Cir).
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once the debt owed to the golden shareholder is fully repaid?181 All
of these factors imply that a major (if not the only) reason for the
golden share provision’s existence originates from the golden
shareholder’s loan to the debtor. Therefore, if these factors are
present, a golden shareholder will be much more likely to exercise
the veto right in a way that benefits its loan and disregards the
debtor’s interests.
4. Application.
We now apply the rule to the facts of Franchise Services. Suppose the debtor’s board presents the bankruptcy matter for a
shareholder vote and the creditor is thinking about vetoing it. The
creditor envisions that the debtor may sue under this Comment’s
rule if it exercises its veto. The creditor must be a controlling
shareholder because its preferred share enables it to veto any
bankruptcy filing. The tricky part is that the court may still not
find the creditor to be interested: although its equity holding exceeds its debt holding by $12 million, the debtor still owes it
$3 million, which is no small amount. Although the debt appears
to be unsecured (a fact unmentioned in the case), it was incurred
at the same time as the debtor adopted the golden share provision. The creditor’s fate is determined by whether it is interested
in the transaction, and the creditor does not like this uncertainty.
If the court finds it to be interested, it will bear the burden to
prove the veto is entirely fair, which is not easy. Thinking about
the rule’s impact, the creditor can veto the bankruptcy only when
the veto is obviously in the debtor’s interest and it can prove that
the veto was entirely fair.
***
Courts have examined many of these factors in existing cases,
but only within the bankruptcy waiver framework. Analysis under that framework is awkward because a court is forced to speculate whether, under all circumstances, the creditor would never
permit bankruptcy filings against its interest, so that the veto
right is equivalent to a bankruptcy waiver. Moving these factors
into the interestedness analysis under the corporate law framework solves this problem because the court would no longer have
to predict with certainty what the golden shareholder would
do, but would only decide whether the golden shareholder’s
181

See, for example, Global Ship Systems, 391 Bankr at 199–200.
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self-interest is capable of swaying its judgment as to the decision
to file for bankruptcy for the debtor.182
E. Impacts of the Approach.
Most golden shareholders who are also creditors of a corporation would likely be found materially interested so long as their
debt holdings are significant enough to influence their judgment
about whether to block the corporation’s bankruptcy. This reality,
coupled with the controlling shareholder status, would compel the
golden shareholder to prove the entire fairness of its decision to
avoid liability for breach of the duty of loyalty.183 The shift of burden to prove entire fairness does not apply in this scenario because if either a majority of the noncontrolling shareholders or a
special committee of directors assented to the nonfiling, the
golden shareholder’s veto would not be contested in court anyway.
This rule does not question a golden share provision’s validity
as long as state corporate law permits it.184 Instead, the rule scrutinizes ex post each golden shareholder’s veto made under the
provision on a case-by-case basis. This enables the court to weed
out self-interested decisions and preserve those for which entire
fairness can be shown. The latter types of decisions are exactly
what we want to retain as legitimate business judgment by corporate decisionmakers. This significantly improves the outcomes
under the original bankruptcy waiver framework, which validates or voids the entire veto right and either leaves room for
bad-faith decisions to go uncontested or blocks good decisions. Additionally, legal expenses would be unlikely to deter potential
plaintiffs (the other creditors) from bringing a lawsuit if they are
already well prepared to go to the bankruptcy court.
One may argue that this approach, while increasing accuracy, would invite lawsuits and increase ex post decision costs by
deciding vetoes on a case-by-case basis. But the rule would actually disincentivize lawsuits ex ante. Proving entire fairness is
182 See Cede, 634 A2d at 362 (affirming that interestedness is not material unless
there is “reasonable probability . . . that the independence of judgment of a ‘reasonable
person’ in the director’s position would be affected”).
183 See Cinerama, Inc v Technicolor, Inc, 663 A2d 1156, 1162 (Del 1995).
184 Accordingly, if the corporation files bankruptcy without the golden shareholder’s
consent, the filing would be dismissed for lack of authority under Price v Gurney. 324 US
at 104. The corporation’s cause of action only arises after it presented a bankruptcy proposal to a vote and got vetoed by the golden shareholder. Arguably, this may make a muchneeded bankruptcy available too late. But as analyzed below, the rule’s ex ante incentives
would make actual lawsuits rare.
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usually an onerous burden.185 Because that burden falls on golden
shareholders, they would be liable when the vetoes are indeed
entirely fair, but they are unable to prove it. A good-faith
shareholder-creditor would thus think twice before adopting a
golden share provision, as there is no inherent need for it to obtain
control over the debtor via a veto right if it just wants the best for
the debtor. With a veto right, the provision would inevitably render the creditor an interested controlling shareholder and expose
it to substantial risk of liability whenever it exercises that right.
Therefore, the creditor would instead opt for voting rights that do
not amount to actual control and trigger entire fairness review.186
This also means that any well-advised creditor who uses a golden
share provision and exercises a veto would make sure that it can
pass muster under the entire fairness test, so any golden share
veto would be made in good faith and very likely bulletproof. On
the other hand, a shareholder-creditor who indeed wishes to block
bankruptcy in bad faith would never adopt such a provision. Not
only would it have no hope of proving the entire fairness of its
veto, rendering the veto void, but the shareholder-creditor would
possibly be subject to monetary damages for the plaintiffs’ expected value from bankruptcy once it loses as a disloyal fiduciary.
By contrast, under the bankruptcy waiver framework, even
if the provision becomes void, the court cannot punish the
golden shareholder. Overall, because this rule disincentivizes all
shareholder-creditors from obtaining controlling status through
golden shares in the corporation’s decision to file for bankruptcy,
the possibility of one creditor opting out of bankruptcy at the expense of other creditors would be reduced.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy’s most fundamental purpose is to maximize an
insolvent business entity’s value for the benefit of all of its
creditors. But that purpose would be defeated if any creditor could
unilaterally opt out of the process. By prohibiting bankruptcy

185 See Weinberger, 457 A2d at 710 (“The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its
demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”).
186 One might argue that this rule unduly limits corporate owners’ freedom of contract
to give certain shareholders control. But the shareholder-creditors who are confident
enough in the merits of their vetoes are still welcome to accept the great power of a veto
right and the great responsibility that comes with it.
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waivers, bankruptcy law mandates a collective proceeding to prevent creditors from dismantling the debtor piece by piece, eliminating the social costs incurred by a race to the courthouse in the
individual collection process. Creditors in turn wield corporate
law. They acquire the debtor’s shares and cloak bankruptcy waivers in bankruptcy veto rights granted by the debtor’s charter. Notwithstanding corporate law’s flexibility toward shareholders in
deciding how to manage their business, courts currently ask
themselves whether they should void those rights as “tantamount” to bankruptcy waivers.187 The fuzzy standard has yet to
develop clear guidelines, and practitioners are left bewildered.
What’s more, existing line-drawing rules within the waiver-or-nowaiver dichotomy tend to either rule out good-faith business decisions or permit self-interested bankruptcy blockage.
This Comment departs from that framework and proposes
imposing fiduciary duties on creditors holding bankruptcy veto
rights in debtor corporations, so that courts can examine specific
bankruptcy vetoes through the entire fairness review under corporate law. Legally relevant facts would be largely the same under both frameworks. But courts will feel more confident in their
reasoning if the facts demonstrate a creditor’s tendency to act in
its own favor rather than making sweeping assertions as to the
creditor’s future behavior. Examination of vetoes case by case
weeds out bad-faith vetoes while retaining entirely fair ones. The
prospect of liability concomitant with actual control of the
debtor’s bankruptcy decision would deter creditors from using
golden shares to block bankruptcy in bad faith, and golden share
lawsuits would thus decrease. At the same time, creditors desiring to exercise control in good faith as the debtor’s owner are still
welcome to undertake the heightened responsibility.
The rule that this Comment proposes is by no means irreproachable, as the ex post determination mechanism may risk delay of much-needed bankruptcy for some debtors. But I maintain
confidence in the rule’s ex ante correction impacts given the high
burden of entire fairness accompanying the fiduciary status to be
imposed on golden shareholders. Lastly, the topic that this Comment grapples with is inevitably entrenched in unsettled discussions of what bankruptcy law aims to accomplish, whether bankruptcy should be mandatory at all, and how far freedom of
contract between a business entity’s owners can go. The solution

187

See, for example, Intervention Energy Holdings, 553 Bankr at 265.
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it offers is premised on how the author views these issues, which
itself is subject to debate. I consider principles of fiduciary duty,
well developed and familiar as they are, to be useful tools for ensuring that bankruptcy will be filed when it should be.

